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AMERICAN NEEDLE, INC. V.  
NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE:  
JUSTICE STEVENS’ LAST  
TWINKLING OF AN EYE 
Katherine Kaso-Howard* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League1 was deemed 
to be the most important sports case in history.2 Sports lawyers and 
commentators alike worried that a win for the National Football 
League (NFL) would further erode antitrust laws and greatly change 
the business of professional football.3 If the U.S. Supreme Court 
affirmed the Seventh Circuit decision, holding that the NFL, 
National Football League Properties (NFLP), and the thirty-two NFL 
teams constituted a single entity for purposes of Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act4 (“Section 1”5), the NFL would essentially become 
 
 * J.D. 2011, Loyola Law School Los Angeles; M.A., California State University 
Dominguez Hills; B.A., University of Southern California. First, I would like to thank Professor 
David W. Kesselman for his guidance and support, as well as for teaching a great Antitrust 
course. Second, I would like to thank Elena De Coste Grieco, Brigitte Mills, and all the members 
of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for their input on this Comment. Last, I am grateful to 
my family, especially my husband, for keeping me motivated. 
 1. 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010). 
 2. See, e.g., Zach Lowe, American Needle: Expect a Draw, AMLAW DAILY (Jan. 13, 
2010), http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2010/01/needleargument.html; Michael 
McCann, Why American Needle–NFL Is Most Important Case in Sports History, SI.COM (Jan. 12, 
2010), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2010/writers/michael_mccann/01/12/americanneedlev.nfl/ 
index.html. 
 3. Drew Brees, The NFL Shouldn’t Call All the Plays, WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 2010, at B02 
(“The gains we fought for and won as players over the years could be lost, while the competition 
that runs through all aspects of the sport could be undermined.”). 
 4. Ch. 647, 29 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006)).  
 5.  Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits “every contract, combination in the form of trust 
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with 
foreign nations . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 1. Section 2 of the act makes it illegal for any “person [to] 
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine with any other person or persons, to 
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign 
nations . . . .” Id. § 2. 
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immune from Section 1 enforcement, and anyone attempting to 
negotiate with the giant entity would have little bargaining ability.6 
Fortunately for the players and others who must deal with the 
NFL, the Supreme Court denied Section 1 immunity and remanded 
the case to the lower court for application of the rule of reason: an 
evaluation of factors to determine whether the NFL’s challenged 
conduct was anticompetitive or procompetitive.7 This was not 
remarkable because courts favor applying the rule of reason in most 
cases, particularly those related to sports.8 What is remarkable, 
however, is the introduction of what this author deems the 
“procompetitive quick look” analysis. Under the Court’s prior quick-
look analysis, full balancing of competitive and anticompetitive 
effects is unnecessary when the challenged activity presents such an 
obvious anticompetitive effect that anyone with a “rudimentary 
understanding of economics”9 can identify the negative impact.10 
When a plaintiff can show anticompetitive effects, quick-look 
analysis tends to favor the plaintiff because the court presumes the 
restraint is unreasonable unless and until the defendant shows 
procompetitive justifications for the restraint.11 Currently, the courts 
have not explicitly employed a comparable presumption for 
defendants. However, in American Needle, Justice Stevens planted 
the seed for the development of a procompetitive quick-look 
analysis, which could lead to an antitrust-enforcement paradigm that 
is more favorable to defendants. 
 
 6. See Brees, supra note 3. From broadcasting deals alone, the NFL earns more revenue 
than the gross domestic product of more than fifty countries. Ross C. Paolino, Upon Further 
Review: How NFL Network Is Violating the Sherman Act, 16 SPORTS LAW. J. 1, 3 (2009). 
 7. Under the rule of reason, courts assess whether the challenged conduct unreasonably 
restrains trade or “merely regulates and . . . thereby promotes competition.” Chi. Bd. of Trade v. 
United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). 
 8. See, e.g., Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (“[T]his Court presumptively 
applies rule of reason analysis . . . .”); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997); Nat’l 
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 99–100 (1984); 
Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc., 610 F.3d 820, 833 (3d Cir. 2010) (“The jury was 
properly instructed to analyze the alleged restraints under the rule of reason . . . .”); Worldwide 
Basketball & Sport Tours, Inc. v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 388 F.3d 955, 957 (6th Cir. 
2004) (applying rule of reason). 
 9. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999). 
 10. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 468 U.S. at 99–100; Fara Daun, Comment, The Content 
Shop: Toward an Economic Legal Structure for Clearing and Licensing Multimedia Content, 30 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 215, 261 (1996). 
 11. United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668–69 (3d Cir. 1993). 
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Part II of this Comment presents the facts, procedural history, 
and reasoning of the Court’s opinion in American Needle. Part III 
provides an overview of the traditional standards to evaluate antitrust 
claims under the Sherman Act. Part IV then argues that Justice 
Stevens suggested an even more deferential evaluation standard—the 
procompetitive quick look—and examines how this standard could 
be applied to antitrust enforcement under Section 1. 
II.  AMERICAN NEEDLE, INC. V. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE 
A.  The Facts 
The NFL is an unincorporated association of thirty-two 
professional football teams.12 Each team is individually owned and 
operated with its own name, logo, and colors.13 For the first forty-
three years of the NFL’s existence, each individual team made its 
own arrangements for intellectual property licensing.14 In 1963, the 
NFL formed the NFLP to collectively develop, license, and market 
the individual teams’ intellectual property.15 Between 1963 and 2000, 
a variety of vendors had nonexclusive licenses with NFLP to 
manufacture and sell apparel with team names, colors, and logos.16 
American Needle, Inc. (ANI) was one such manufacturer. In 2000, 
team owners voted to allow the NFLP the power to grant exclusive 
licenses, in the hopes of increasing then-waning merchandise 
revenue.17 In 2001, Reebok won a ten-year exclusive license to 
manufacture and sell trademarked apparel, including headwear, for 
all thirty-two teams; as a result, the NFLP did not renew ANI’s 
nonexclusive license.18 
 
 12. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2207 (2010). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. John Gibeaut, A League of Their Own: The NFL Wants to Run Up the Score on Its 
Antitrust Exemption, 96 A.B.A. J. 19, 20 (2010). 
 18. Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2207; see also Gibeaut, supra note 17, at 20 (“By the end of 
2002, sales had increased 21 percent, to $1.1 billion. . . . [F]itted caps that sold for $19.99 before 
the deal rose to $30 by 2006.”). 
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B.  The Lower Courts’ Decisions 
ANI filed suit in the Northern District of Illinois, alleging that 
the agreements between the thirty-two teams, the NFL, the NFLP, 
and Reebok, Inc. (collectively “the defendants”) violated both 
Section 1 and Section 2 of the Sherman Act.19 ANI only challenged 
the 2000 agreement between the NFL and Reebok and did not 
dispute the NFLP’s legitimacy as a joint venture.20 
At the district court, the NFL argued that Section 1’s threshold 
requirement—the existence of an arrangement that is a contract, 
combination, or conspiracy between two or more actors—was not 
met because the defendants were essentially one entity, and thus 
could not conspire.21 Single-entity status would grant complete 
immunity from Section 1 enforcement to agreements between the 
teams and the NFL.22 Ultimately, the defendants’ arguments 
persuaded the district court, which granted summary judgment for 
the defendants because the teams had “so integrated their operations 
that they should be deemed to be a single entity rather than joint 
ventures cooperating for a common purpose.”23 
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court.24 
Acknowledging that a sports league can constitute a single entity for 
antitrust purposes in some contexts but not in others, the court 
focused on the conduct at issue—licensing of teams’ intellectual 
property.25 The Seventh Circuit found that through the NFLP “only 
one source of economic power controls the promotion of NFL 
football; it makes little sense to assert that each individual team has 
 
 19. Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2207. Section 2 of the Sherman Act makes it illegal for any 
“person [to] monopolize . . . any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with 
foreign nations.” 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
 20. Brief for the NFL Respondents at 10–11, Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (No. 08-661). 
Independently owned franchises in a professional sports league can be separate entities engaged 
in a joint venture. See 46 AM. JUR. 2D Joint Ventures § 1 (2009). A “joint venture” is an 
association of independent entities that collaborate in a single business venture for joint profit. Id. 
Joint ventures are subject to Section 1 and are often analyzed under the rule of reason. Texaco 
Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006); Sullivan v. Nat’l Football League, 34 F.3d 1091, 1099 (1st 
Cir. 1994); L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1388–90 
(9th Cir. 1984). 
 21. Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2204; Brief for the NFL Respondents, supra note 20, at 8. 
 22. Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2207. 
 23. Am. Needle, Inc. v. New Orleans La. Saints, 496 F. Supp. 2d 941, 943 (N.D. Ill. 2007). 
 24. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 538 F.3d 736, 741 (7th Cir. 2008), rev’d 130 
S. Ct. 2201 (2010). 
 25. Id. 
  
Spring 2011]              AMERICAN NEEDLE, INC. V. NFL 1167 
the authority, if not the responsibility, to promote the jointly 
produced NFL football.”26 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s finding that the defendants should be deemed a single entity 
for Section 1 purposes.27 
C.  Holding and Reasoning 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and in a unanimous 
opinion reversed the Seventh Circuit. The Supreme Court found that 
the agreement to grant an exclusive license for all thirty-two teams’ 
intellectual property necessarily required a combination of  
independent decision makers and, therefore, the defendants did not 
constitute a single entity for Section 1 purposes.28 On review, the 
Supreme Court limited the issue to  
whether the NFL respondents are capable of engaging in a 
“contract, combination . . . , or conspiracy” as defined by 
§ 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, or, as we have 
sometimes phrased it, whether the alleged activity by the 
NFL respondents “must be viewed as that of a single 
enterprise for purposes of § 1.”29 
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Stevens first noted that 
whether concerted action exists is a “functional consideration” of 
how the parties actually operate, instead of a consideration of 
whether the parties are legally distinct entities.30 The courts must 
look to the nature of the concerted action and its practical impacts on 
business.31 Justice Stevens further explained that the term “single 
entity” is somewhat misleading because the inquiry is not simply 
whether the defendant “is a legally single entity or has a single 
name.”32 Rather a joint venture’s ability to defend its arrangement 
depends on whether, through the venture, “separate economic actors 
pursu[e] separate economic interests” such that the agreement 
“deprives the marketplace of independent centers of decision 
 
 26. Id. at 743. 
 27. Id. at 744. 
 28. Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2214–16. 
 29. Id. at 2208 (citing Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984)). 
 30. Id. at 2209. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 2211. 
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making . . . and thus of actual or potential competition.”33 The 
substance of a given joint venture or agreement determines the 
answer to this question, not its form or legal status.34 
In rejecting the Seventh Circuit’s holding that joint decisions 
regarding the licensing of intellectual property were immune from 
Section 1, the Court first noted that each team is independently 
owned and managed with necessarily separate corporate 
motivations.35 Although it acknowledged that some cooperation is 
necessary to produce professional football, it recognized that the 
teams still compete “not only on the playing field” but also for fans, 
players, and coaches.36 Specifically at issue in American Needle, 
teams compete in the intellectual property market because a team’s 
profit-maximizing goal, and not the NFL’s common interest, 
motivates each team to license its property.37 Unlike scheduling 
games or coordinating the annual draft, the teams did not need to 
abrogate their independent power to license intellectual property in 
order for the league to function.38 As such, this cooperation did not 
warrant treatment as a single entity’s independent action.39 
Next, the Court rejected the defendants’ argument that NFLP 
was immune from Section 1 just because of NFLP’s independent 
legal status and separate management.40 Although agreements within 
a single firm warrant a presumption that divisions of the firm all 
work toward one goal—the firm’s profit maximization—NFLP 
presented a “close[] question” and ultimately a “rare case” in which 
the presumption did not hold.41 When entering licensing agreements, 
NFLP was a mere instrumentality of the teams because thirty-two 
different teams, each competing for individual profit maximization 
and not collective profit, controlled NFLP’s conduct.42 Because the 
agreement between NFLP and Reebok prevented each team from 
 
 33. Id. at 2212 (citations omitted). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 2212–13. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 2214. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 2215. 
 42. Id. 
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negotiating its own licenses, the Court found that the agreement 
clearly denied the market of independent decision makers.43 
Therefore, the Court ruled that the teams’ joint decision to grant 
exclusive licenses to Reebok constituted concerted action subject to 
Section 1.44 
In closing, Justice Stevens noted that the special nature of the 
professional sports industry provides some justification for 
agreements between the teams and the league.45 If restraints on trade 
are necessary to make a product available, the per se rules of 
illegality do not apply.46 Instead the conduct will be analyzed under 
the “flexible Rule of Reason.”47 
III.  ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 
A.  Standards of Evaluation Under the Sherman Act 
Section 1 prohibits “[e]very contract . . . in restraint of 
trade . . . .”48 This language, however, cannot be interpreted literally 
because all contracts or combinations restrain trade to some degree.49 
Accordingly, Section 1 prohibits only those contracts or 
combinations that are “unreasonably restrictive of competitive 
conditions.”50 To determine whether a restraint of trade is 
unreasonably restrictive under Section 1, courts use three main types 
of analyses: the rule of reason, per se, and quick look.51 
1.  Rule of Reason 
Absent horizontal price-fixing or group boycotts,52 the default 
analysis courts use is the rule of reason.53 Under the rule of reason, 
 
 43. Id. at 2214–15. 
 44. Id. at 2216. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 49. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911). 
 50. Id. 
 51. United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668–69 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 52. Horizontal price-fixing occurs when competitors agree to tamper with the prices of 
goods or services. 1 JULIAN O. VON KALINOWSKI ET AL., ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE 
REGULATION § 13.01 (2d ed. 2010). Horizontal group boycotts, also known as concerted refusals 
to deal, are combinations of companies at the same level of distribution whose purpose is to 
exclude a direct competitor from the market. Id. § 12.02(d). 
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courts inquire whether the restraint at issue promotes or suppresses 
competition.54 Initially, the plaintiff must show that the alleged 
combination or agreement produces adverse, anticompetitive effects 
within the relevant product and geographic markets.55 The plaintiff 
may satisfy this burden by providing direct evidence of actual 
anticompetitive effects, such as reduced output or increased prices, 
or evidence of the defendant’s market power that leads to an 
inference of anticompetitive effects.56 If the plaintiff can meet this 
initial burden, the defendant must then show that the challenged 
conduct promotes a sufficiently procompetitive objective.57 To rebut, 
the plaintiff must prove that the restraint is not reasonably necessary 
to achieve the stated objective or that there are less restrictive 
alternatives available to the defendant.58 
2.  Per Se Illegality 
Under Section 1, some restraints—such as horizontal price-
fixing and market-allocation agreements among competitors—are 
presumed unreasonable restraints on trade “because of their 
pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue.”59 
These patently anticompetitive practices are considered illegal per se, 
without the need to consider the possible procompetitve business 
motivations behind them.60 Examples of such restraints include 
horizontal agreements to boycott competitors or deny essential 
services, horizontal agreements between competitors to divide 
territories, and agreements between competitors to fix prices.61 
 
 53. Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (“[T]his Court presumptively applies rule of 
reason analysis . . . .”); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997). 
 54. Nat’l Soc’y Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978). 
 55. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 668. “The relevant product market is defined as ‘those 
commodities reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the same purposes’ and may be used 
as substitutes.” Korkala v. Allpro Imaging, Inc., No. 08-2712, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70727, at 
*15–16, (D. N.J. Aug. 10, 2009). The geographic market is that area in which a firm produces or 
sells. U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines §1.2 (2010). 
 56. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 668. 
 57. Id. at 669. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (“Per se liability is reserved for only those 
agreements that are so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed to 
establish their illegality.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 61. VON KALINOWSKI ET AL., supra note 52, at § 12.02. 
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Beyond these plainly naked restraints, courts are reluctant “to adopt 
per se rules . . . where the economic impact of certain practices is not 
immediately obvious.”62 
3.  Quick-Look analysis 
In addition to the rule of reason and per se rule, courts apply an 
abbreviated or quick-look rule-of-reason analysis.63 This is an 
“intermediate standard” that “applies in cases where per se 
condemnation is inappropriate, but where no elaborate industry 
analysis is required.”64 In such cases, “an observer with even a 
rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude that the 
arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive effect on 
customers and markets.”65 
Quick-look analysis developed, particularly in sports cases, to 
address restraints that might have otherwise served legitimate 
competitive purposes or been necessary for the product to get to the 
market at all.66 Due to the suspect nature of horizontal agreements, 
however, even a legitimate purpose does not necessitate full rule-of-
reason analysis if the agreement constitutes a naked restraint on price 
or output.67 
From a policy perspective, quick-look analysis strikes a balance 
between competing concerns. It moves away from per se rules that 
are no longer appropriate for modern, dynamic markets and 
commercial relationships,68 but it also promotes judicial efficiency by 
 
 62. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 63. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 669; see Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of 
Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109 n.39 (1984). 
 64. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 669 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Fed. Trade 
Comm’n v. Ind. Fed’n Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986); Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 468 
U.S. at 109; Nat’l Soc’y Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978). 
 65. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999). 
 66. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 468 U.S. at 101–04, 109–13 (holding that the power and 
effect of the agreement did not need to be ascertained in excruciating detail and, importantly, that 
there was no need to define the relevant market and determine the relevant market percentages). 
 67. Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 770 (“[Q]uick-look analysis carries the day when the 
great likelihood of anticompetitive effects can easily be ascertained.”). 
 68. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886–87 (2007) 
(“[T]he per se rule is appropriate only after courts have had considerable experience with the type 
of restraint at issue, and only if courts can predict with confidence that it would be invalidated in 
all or almost all instances under the rule of reason. [Courts] have expressed reluctance to adopt 
per se rules . . . where the economic impact of certain practices is not immediately obvious.” 
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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avoiding lengthy rule-of-reason litigation.69 With new industries and 
innovations, it is not always clear whether horizontal agreements will 
inevitably result in harm to competition and consumers.70 By 
applying quick-look analysis, defendants in emerging industries and 
new-market entrants may be given the chance to rebut the 
presumption of illegality while allowing innovation to continue 
without bogging down the courts.71 
Under quick-look analysis, courts have employed two 
approaches. One approach more closely mirrors the per se rule in that 
the court presumes competitive harm as a basis for the plaintiff’s 
prima facie case unless and until the defendant can demonstrate some 
procompetitive business justification.72 The other technique more 
closely resembles the rule-of-reason analysis by employing a 
“flexible” inquiry—examining likely anticompetitive effects, market 
power, and efficiencies to the degree necessary to understand the 
alleged suppression of competition.73 It can be difficult for courts and 
litigants to ascertain which method of analysis should apply, 
especially when the Supreme Court itself acknowledges that “there is 
often no bright line separating” the different modes of analysis.74 
 
 69. Adam Weg, Note, Per Se Treatment: An Unnecessary Relic of Antitrust Litigation, 60 
HASTINGS L.J. 1535, 1542 (2009) (discussing the benefits of quick-look analysis). 
 70. See id. at 1542–44. 
 71. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 89–90 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (refusing to apply 
per se analysis to bundling of software because it would “create[] undue risks of error and [] 
deter[] welfare-enhancing innovation”). 
 72. United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 669 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting that under quick-
look analysis, the competitive harm is presumed and “the defendant must promulgate some 
competitive justification for the restraint” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 73. 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF 
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 1508c (3d ed. 2006); see also Law v. Nat’l 
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1020 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding that an anticompetitive 
effect is established when the plaintiff shows a horizontal price-fixing agreement); Chi. Prof’l 
Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n (Bulls I), 961 F.2d 667, 674 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(recognizing that the first step in any rule-of-reason analysis is an assessment of market power). 
 74. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104 
n.26 (1984); see also Cal. Dental Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 526 U.S. 756, 779 (1999) (“The 
truth is that our categories of analysis of anticompetitive effect are less fixed than terms like ‘per 
se,’ ‘quick look,’ and ‘rule of reason’ tend to make them appear.”). 
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B.  The Sherman Act and Sports Leagues 
At a basic level, sports leagues are formed by horizontal 
agreements among direct competitors.75 However, courts have 
traditionally treated sports leagues’ horizontal agreements differently 
than other horizontal agreements, and such agreements have not been 
subject to the per se rule.76 Courts have long recognized that some 
cooperation between competitors (the teams) is necessary if the 
product (organized games leading to a championship) is to be 
available at all.77 Both quick look and rule of reason have applied to 
agreements between leagues and teams.78 
For example, in National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Board of 
Regents of the University of Oklahoma,79 although the football 
television broadcasting rights of the National Collegiate Athletic 
Association (NCAA) created horizontal price-fixing and output 
limitation, the Court did not apply the per se rule.80 Rather, the Court 
used the rule of reason because the horizontal restraints on 
competition were essential to make the product available at all.81 
Similarly, in Law v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,82 when 
evaluating an NCAA rule limiting the annual compensation for 
men’s assistant basketball coaches, the Tenth Circuit did not apply 
the per se rule because some horizontal cooperation was necessary to 
 
 75. See Sports Business Cases Challenge League Power, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNSEL, 
Aug. 2010, at 26 (“Sports leagues are artificial entities made up of individual teams that choose to 
join together to create what is in effect an annual tournament. They do this because they believe 
that there will be more interest, and thus more potential revenue, from a tournament competition 
than there would be from individual contests between teams.”). 
 76. E.g., Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 468 U.S. at 100–01 (1984) (“[I]t would be 
inappropriate to apply a per se rule to this case. . . . [W]hat is critical is that this case involves an 
industry in which horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be 
available at all.”). 
 77. Id. at 101; Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n (Bulls II), 95 F.3d 593 
(7th Cir. 1996); L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 
1984). 
 78. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 468 U.S. at 101; Law, 134 F.3d at 1010. 
 79. 468 U.S. 85. 
 80. Id. at 101; see also James S. Arico, Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Board of Regents 
of the University of Oklahoma: Has the Supreme Court Abrogated the Per Se Rule of Antitrust 
Analysis?, 19 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 437, 468–70 (1985) (discussing the erosion of the per se rule). 
 81. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 468 U.S. at 101; The Truncated or “Quick Look” Rule of 
Reason, FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/opp/jointvent/3Persepap.shtm (last modified 
June 25, 2006). 
 82. 134 F.3d 1010. 
  
1174          LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:1163 
produce college sports.83 However, the court also determined that full 
rule-of-reason analysis was unnecessary because the coaches’ salary 
cap succeeded in artificially lowering the prices for coaching 
services.84 With this showing, the court went directly to the question 
of whether the procompetitive justifications advanced outweighed 
the anticompetitive effects under quick-look analysis and concluded 
that they did not.85 
IV.  ANALYSIS: POTENTIAL FOR A PROCOMPETITIVE QUICK LOOK 
Although counted as a rare win for plaintiffs in an antitrust case 
before the Supreme Court,86 American Needle may have actually 
opened the door for a new method of analysis that favors defendants 
with the introduction of what this author titles the “procompetitive 
quick look.”87 It seems that applying the traditional per se–like quick 
look—in which the court presumes anticompetitive effects—will not 
be applied in joint-venture cases.88 However, Justice Stevens referred 
to the quick-look analysis when he noted that “depending upon the 
concerted activity in question, the Rule of Reason may not require a 
detailed analysis; it ‘can sometimes be applied in the twinkling of an 
eye.’”89 
This “twinkling of an eye” concept is not new to Section 1 
analysis, but the context in which Justice Stevens employs it is novel. 
First, Stevens reminded the reader that cooperation between teams 
and the league may be perfectly legitimate: 
Football teams that need to cooperate are not trapped by 
antitrust law . . . . The fact that NFL teams share an interest 
 
 83. Id. at 1019. 
 84. Id. at 1020. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Judd E. Stone & Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust Formalism Is Dead! Long Live Antitrust 
Formalism! Some Implications of American Needle v. NFL, 2010 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 369, 399 
(2010) (“American Needle was the first case since 1992 that the Supreme Court resolved in favor 
of a private antitrust plaintiff.”). 
 87. Others have recognized American Needle’s potential endorsement of a defendant-
friendly quick-look analysis as well. James A. Keyte, American Needle: A New Quick Look for 
Joint Ventures, ANTITRUST MAG., Fall 2010, at 48, 51. 
 88. Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 7 n.3 (2006). But see supra Part III.C (discussing 
quick-look analysis in sports cases). 
 89. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2216–17 (2010) (quoting 
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109 n.39 
(1984)). 
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in making the entire league successful and profitable, and 
that they must cooperate in the production and scheduling 
of games, provides a perfectly sensible justification for 
making a host of collective decisions . . . . In such 
instances, the agreement is likely to survive the Rule of 
Reason.90 
This juxtaposition of the traditional quick-look—twinkling-of-
an-eye—language with the potentially procompetitive justifications 
for agreements among the teams introduces the potential for a 
defendant to prevent a plaintiff from fully developing its cases and 
instead bring an early motion for summary judgment based on the 
procompetitive version of the quick-look analysis. 
Generally under quick-look analysis, if the plaintiff can show 
anticompetitive effects despite the defendant’s purportedly legitimate 
purpose for the agreement, the court presumes the agreement 
unreasonably restrains trade.91 If the defendant cannot meet its 
burden of showing procompetitive justifications, under quick look 
the court need not consider other factors—such as market share or 
market power—that the traditional rule-of-reason analysis requires.92 
But what if at the outset the defendant can show that the 
procompetitive effects far outweigh any potential anticompetitive 
effects—should the defendant then be entitled to a presumption 
similar to the one that the plaintiff receives? 
A procompetitive quick look can serve the same policy goals as 
the anticompetitive quick look by allowing courts to dispose of cases 
with analyses short of full-blown rule-of-reason analysis (for 
example, when the plaintiff’s evidence of anticompetitive effects is 
weak as compared to the defendant’s procompetitive justifications). 
Because this method of analysis provides a strong presumption in 
favor of defendants, application of the procompetitive quick look 
could be limited to cases concerning restraints in industries in which 
cooperation is inherently necessary. Under this version of quick look, 
courts would presume the agreement’s legality for a defendant who 
shows strong procompetitive justifications and a need to cooperate. 
 
 90. Id. at 2216 (citations omitted). 
 91. See supra Part III.A.3. 
 92. See Bulls II, 95 F.3d 593, 600 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Substantial market power is an 
indispensable ingredient of every claim under the full Rule of Reason.”). 
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The plaintiff would then have the opportunity to show any actual 
negative effects on competition, and—depending on the weight of 
these effects—the court could decide to end the analysis there. 
For example, consider American Needle: if ANI could not show 
significant and pernicious anticompetitive effects caused by the 
exclusivity agreement with Reebok,93 the NFL would have the 
opportunity to show that the centralized negotiations for exclusive 
dealing created strong procompetitive justifications. Possible 
justifications include lower transaction costs because licensees would 
only have to negotiate with one party instead of striking individual 
deals with each team, potentially also lowering prices for consumers; 
improved quality and uniformity of merchandise; and improved 
likelihood of preserving competition among the weak and strong 
teams. Combined with the inherent need for cooperation to produce 
professional football, a court could decide that deeper market 
analysis is unnecessary to uphold the restraint. 
This approach would further the Supreme Court’s goals of 
limiting per se application while also avoiding protracted litigation 
under the rule of reason. Essentially, by allowing courts to avoid the 
difficult issue of defining the relevant market and the defendants’ 
market share, procompetitive quick look removes a contentious and 
costly issue of fact from litigation. In the NFL example, the court 
would no longer need to consider whether the NFL competes with all 
media and entertainment or simply with all other professional 
sports—often a difficult question to answer because each side 
produces competing experts with complicated economic analyses 
that can be tiresome for juries to wade through.94 
 
 93. In American Needle, ANI did present evidence that prices increased once the agreement 
with Reebok went into effect. Gibeaut, supra note 17, at 20. 
 94. For example, as the Third Circuit reviewed in Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc., 
610 F.3d 820 (3d Cir. 2010), at the district court level experts used different methods and 
evidence to come to different definitions of the relevant market. Compare Expert Witness 
Deposition of Andrew Zimbalist at *1, Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 97851 (D. Del. Oct. 19, 2009) (No. 07-178), 2008 Depo. Trans. LEXIS 8142 (“Q. The 
first conclusion you report in that paragraph is, ‘The relevant product market is the production of 
top-tier men’s professional tennis.’ A. Yes.”), with Expert Witness Deposition of Johnathan 
Walker, Ph.D. at *1–2, Deutscher Tennis Bund, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97851 (No. 07-178), 
2008 Depo. Trans. LEXIS 8132 (“I considered my general background in sports economics and 
an understanding about what a tennis event actually is, and all of those led me to conclude that 
consumers have other alternatives to ATP tennis, besides ATP tennis, itself. . . . [I] came to the 
conclusion that . . . there must be substitutes for tennis other than other tennis events.”). See 
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Although aligned with some Supreme Court goals, a 
procompetitive quick look could also have a negative impact on 
antitrust enforcement. First, plaintiffs already face a very steep climb 
under the rule of reason. In a recent empirical study, Professor 
Michael Carrier of Rutgers University School of Law found that 
courts only reach balancing of the competitive effects under the rule 
of reason in 2 percent of bench trials.95 In most cases courts 
dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims before reaching the balancing stage 
of the rule of reason for want of anticompetitive effects.96 Under the 
procompetitive quick look, plaintiffs’ difficulties could be further 
exacerbated because they would lose the chance to develop the full 
record necessary to balance all potential effects on competition and 
consumers.97 Because market power in the relevant market can often 
be a determinative factor in any antitrust case,98 without market 
definition or examination of the defendants’ power in that market, 
already difficult cases for plaintiffs would become almost 
impossible. Second, taking the balancing question away from juries 
greatly increases the likelihood that defendants will prevail as courts 
already rarely reach the balancing stage of the rule of reason on their 
own.99 
V. CONCLUSION 
Whether desirable or not, the possibility of some form of 
procompetitive quick-look analysis is very real.100 In light of the 
Supreme Court’s limitation of per se application, Carrier’s data, and 
the Court’s recent history of siding with antitrust defendants, the rule 
 
generally 1 AM. BAR. ASSOC., ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 555–85 (6th ed. 2007) 
(discussing courts’ varying approaches to defining relevant markets). 
 95. Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for the 21st Century, 16 
GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 827, 829 (2009). 
 96.  Id. Furthermore, even if a court conducted balancing analysis, it did so in a cursory 
manner once the defendant had shown procompetitive effects. Id. at 831.  
 97. See id. at 828 (finding that courts dispose of 97 percent of cases under the rule of reason 
for plaintiffs’ failures to show anticompetitive effects). 
 98. Bulls II, 95 F.3d at 600. For an example of how market power can greatly affect the 
outcome of a case, compare two similar vertical-restraint cases: United States v. Arnold, Schwinn 
& Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), and Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
 99. Carrier, supra note 97, at 829–30. 
 100. See BCB Anesthesia Care, Ltd. v. Passavant Mem’l Area Hosp. Ass’n, 36 F.3d 664 (7th 
Cir. 1994) (affirming dismissal without full rule-of-reason analysis when the alleged 
anticompetitive impacts on the market were minimal). 
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of reason seems to have already been severely truncated in many 
cases, not just those in which plaintiffs show anticompetitive effects. 
Articulation of a procompetitive quick look would further insulate 
defendants from the enforcement of antitrust laws. However, by 
applying a procompetitive quick look in cases involving industries in 
which cooperation is necessary, courts could avoid lengthy litigation 
when the defendant demonstrates increased efficiency, cost savings, 
and other procompetitive benefits.  
